Policy and Information Systems implementation: The Greek Property Tax Information System Case by Anagnostopoulos, Dimosthenis et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Anagnostopoulos, Dimosthenis and Papadopoulos, Thanos and Stamati, Teta and Balta, M.  (2018)
Policy and Information Systems implementation: The Greek Property Tax Information System
Case.   Information Systems Frontiers .    ISSN 1387-3326.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-018-9887-y











Dimosthenis Anagnostopoulos  
Department of Informatics and Telematics 
Harokopio University of Athens, Tavros, Greece 





Kent Business School, The University of Kent 






Department of Informatics and Telecommunications 
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece 





Kent Business School, The University of Kent 
Canterbury CT2 7FS, UK  
Email: m.balta@kent.ac.uk  
 










This study contributes to the literature on Information Systems (IS) implementation and provides 
insights into how IS implementation emerges as an assemblage constituted by diverse 
sociomaterial practices ²that is, the intertwining of humans and technology in practice² during the 
implementation RI*UHHFH·V<HDUO\3URSHUW\7D[SROLF\DQGLQIRUPDtion system over the period 
1997-2015. Drawing RQWKHZRUNRI'HOHX]H*XDWWDULDQG'HODQGDRQ¶DVVHPEODJHWKHRU\·DQG
%XUNH·Von PRWLYHH[SUHVVHGDV¶LQWHQWLRQality·DQG¶PRWLYDWLRQ·we discuss IS implementation as 
a performative process that is shaped by assemblage DJHQWV· intentionality and motivation and 
conclude that explicitly attending to these dynamics during the emergence of policy and technology 
as a sociomaterial assemblage contributes to a better understanding of IS implementation and its 
success. We propose that higher levels of motivation and intentionality are related to higher 
chances of successful implementation. Finally, limitations and future research directions are 
proposed. 
 




Countries worldwide are implementing Information Systems (IS) to reform their public sector (e.g. 
Avgerou and McGrath, 2007; Bloomfield and Hayes, 2009; Ciborra, 2005; Butler and McGovern, 
2012; Cordella and Iannacci, 2010; Sadiq et al., 2012; Papazafeiropoulou and Spanaki, 2016). 
Reviews of the literature provide different views of how IS is implemented and adopted: firstly, by 
adopting the functional paradigm (Hirschheim and Klein 1989) and an ¶apolitical·stance towards 
understanding implementation through technology acceptance and diffusion of innovations 
(Davis, 1989; Rogers, 2003; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Dwivendi et al, 2017; Fosso Wamba et al., 2017; 
Rana et al., 2017) ; and secondly, discussing IS implementation by underlining the culture and 
context as complex structures characterised by the interweaving of actors and diverse political, 
public and private sector agendas (Robey and Markus, 1984;  Avgerou et al. 2004; Avgerou and 
McGrath, 2007; Ciborra 2002; Ciborra and Lanzara 1994; Dang et al., 2017; Introna 1997; Irani et 
al., 2007; 2008; Walsham, 2001). Finally, the sociomateriality turn in IS ´challenges the deeply 
taken-for-granted assumption that technology, work, and organizations should be conceptualized 
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separately and advances the view that there is an inherent inseparability between the technical and 
WKH VRFLDOµ 2UOLNRZVNL DQG 6FRWW . This is either by assuming  WKDW ´WKH VRFLDO DQG WKH
PDWHULDO DUH LQKHUHQWO\ LQVHSDUDEOHµ (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, p. 456), or by adopting a 
substantialist ontology that discusses the imbrication of human and material agencies, which are 
distinct but when mutually interlocked they are effective in achieving outcomes (Leonardi, 2012, 
2013; Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014). 
Yet, there is dearth of literature discussing the imbrication of human and material agencies during 
IS implementation from a different perspective, and this gave us the motivation for this paper. 
Hence, we develop a performative lens to IS implementation based on Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), DeLanda (2006; 2011), as well as on Burke·V (1969a; 1969b; 2003) motive to introduce 
intentionality (desire to achieve a goal or a set of goals, referring to the material) and motivation 
(passion to achieve a goal or set of goals, referring to the social) (Schandorf and Karatzogianni, 
2016) as apparatus to study the entanglement of the social and the material and their impact on IS 
implementation. Our research question is the following: How is IS implementation shaped by the 
emergence of diverse sociomaterial practices ²that is, the intertwining of humans and technology 
(Orlikowski, 2007)? In answering our research question, we present and discuss a qualitative case 
study of *UHHFH·V3URSHUW\7D[6\VWHP from 1997-2015.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we offer an overview of the 
sociomaterial lens to IS implementation. Then we illustrate the perspective deployed in our analysis 
and its relevance for studying the imbrication of social and material on IS implementation. This is 
followed by the analysis of our case study. Finally, we discuss the results of this study in light of 
the literature and provide a summary of our findings, implications on policy and practice, 
limitations and future research.  
 
2. Sociomateriality and Information Systems implementation: Deleuze, DeLanda, and 
Burke  
A sociomaterial perspective (Barad, 2003; Leonardi 2011; Leonardi and Barley 2008; Orlikowski 
and Scott 2008) shifts the focus from how technology influences humans and vice versa to how 
WKH ¶PDWHULDO· LV LQIXVHG LQHYHU\GD\practices, theorizing the relationship between humans and 
objects as mutually constitutive and emergent.  
From an ontological perspective, sociomateriality follows two schools of thought: the relative 
school that assumes the inseparable and mutual constitution of the social and the material (Barad, 
2003; Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008); and the substantialist school (Leonardi, 2012, 
2013), where human and material agencies are distinct and they have inherent properties, but their 
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imbrication and mutual interlocking results in achieving particular outcomes (Cecez-Kecmanovic 
et al., 2014).  
Empirical studies of sociomateriality include, for instance, critical care (Jones, 2014), social media 
(Scott and Orlikowski, 2014), and the development, introduction and use of a computing grid 
infrastructure (Venters et al., 2014). The sociomaterial perspective has also been used by Doolin 
and McLeod (2012) to conceptualise boundary objects (Carlile, 2002; 2004) as sociomaterial 
assemblages, their performative nature and distributed agency within organizational practices, and 
the consequences and performances of diverse assemblages over time. Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 
(2014) have used a performative perspective to conceptualise IS success and failure as relational 
effects of sociomaterial actor-networks of developers, managers, technologies, project documents, 
methodologies and other actors that negotiate objectives, timelines, resources, as well as different 
agencies of assessment that perform IS assessments.  
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the sociomateriality debate by taking an alternative turn in 
the sociomaterial view of IS implementation drawing on the works of 'HOHX]H DQG*XDWWDUL·V
(1987) assemblage theory as extended by DeLanda (2006; 2011) and BurNH·VDE 
concept of motive.  
According to Deleuze and DeLanda, an assemblage refers to an arrangement and grouping of 
heterogeneous parts, including discursive (e.g. routines, techniques), social (e.g. structures) and 
material artefacts that relate to each other due to a shared desire to achieve a particular goal. The 
effect of this shared desire is passion, which is mobilised differently by different assemblages 
(Schandorf and Karatzogianni, 2016). DeLanda (2006; 2011) has added properties in the 
assemblage that shift the focus from being human-centred to accommodate also the non-
human/artefact: firstly, the identity of an assemblage as expressed in the materiality of its parts; 
and secondly, the definition of an assemblage based on the tendencies and capacities of its parts 
that define its possibilities of action.  
To understand how the assemblage comes into being, we draw on %XUNH·Vmotives. Schandorf and 
Karatzogianni (2014) suggest two attributes to define ¶motive·, that is, ¶motivation· and 
¶intentionality· ´motivation is inherently rhetorical and affective, an inevitably embodied, 
emotional force or capacity grounded in symbolic social identifications, intentionality is a 
programmatic, even algorithmic, goal-oriented force or tendency characterizing any agent, human 
RURWKHUZLVHSXUVXLQJDVHWRIRXWFRPHVDQGKDYLQJDQLQIOXHQFHRQRWKHUDJHQWVLQLWVZRUOGµ
Motivation can be affective and may or may not be directly related to reasoned or intended 
outcomes, whereas intentioQDOLW\LV´defined in relation to a set of goals that may be innate and/or 




intention and passion as motivation and hence a desire (as intentional force) is an effect of passion 
(as motivation). 7KHUHIRUHLQWHQWLRQLVOLQNHGWRD´PDFKLQLFGHVLUHµRIQRQ-humans and artefacts, 
whereas motivated human agents within WKHDVVHPEODJHPDQLIHVW´SDVVLRQµ. 
We use the FRQFHSWVRILQWHQWLRQDQGPRWLYDWLRQLQOLQHZLWK'HOHX]H*XDWWDULDQG'H/DQGD·V
theorisation of passion and desire to explain dynamism within assemblages during IS 
implementation (e.g. how they come into being, how they can be held together and how they can 
evolve into new assemblages). They can assist us in evaluating whether ¶performation· (i.e. the 
process of performativity) (Yeow and Faraj, 2014) is successful ²that is, the assemblage is 
performing as intended, or further work is required. Hence, performation looks at both how the 
assemblage changes (e.g. the introduction of an IS) and how the altered or emerging assemblage 
is performing (ibid).  
The concepts of assemblage and performativity have been used in a recent study by Yeow and 
Faraj (2014). They discussed the emergence of sociomaterial practices after the implementation of 
IS in two clinics within a hospital, which demonstrated patterns of constituting, counter-
performing, calibrating, and stratifying that explained the process of sociomaterial change. Yet, 
there are studies to explore the emergence of sociomaterial practices during IS implementation, 
giving us the impetus for this paper and contributing to our deeper understanding of the 
performativity of sociomaterial assemblages. 
 
3. Methodology and background of the study 
3.1 The background of the study 
The Greek case was chosen as the research context of this study. Greece is classified as a developed 
country. The global debt crisis which burst out in late 2008 and the subsequent public debate 
regarding the falsification of statistical data of the financial situation of Greece drove up its 
borrowing costs. In April 2010, Greece was under debt crisis and could no longer borrow from 
the international markets. Two financial help packages together with strict austerity measures were 
agreed in 2010 and 2012 to help Greece deal with the consequences of crisis and enable growth. 
The Greek Government had to undergo substantive reforms aimed at efficiency and good 
governance, while at the same time increasing tax revenues. To tackle tax evasion, though, is not 
an easy task. The OECD estimated that in August 2009 the yearly unpaid taxes were around 20B½. 
Furthermore, Greek Property Taxes are about half the OECD average level of 2.6% GDP, that is, 
1.3%, but are complex so that estate owners may end up paying 14 different types of taxes and 
levies. While property tax accounts for 0.14% of the total tax revenue, the collection represents 
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1.1% of total tax administration costs (OECD, 2009). Therefore, the reform of the property tax 
system through a national land registry, tax calculation, and tax collection systems will allow 
property taxation based on the real value of assets. However, as reforms were not accomplished 
in due time and fiscal targets were not met, a third financial help package (bailout program) was 
agreed on July 2015. 
Key to the enforcement of national property taxation policy is IS/IT, being vital for income 
generation and decrease in public debt. Here, a controversy-laden IS/IT implementation is 
described, which lasted for more than fifteen years and still undergoes significant changes in 
enforcing the taxation policy. The efforts to develop and implement the system were supported 
by local private partners. We use the nuances and concepts from Deleuze, Guattari, DeLanda, and 
Burke to unpack these assemblage dynamics that underlie complex IT/IS implementation settings. 
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
This paper adopts a qualitative research approach (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Silverman, 2001; Yin, 
2003). Primary and secondary data were collected from September 2007 to October 2014 in 
Greece from relevant stakeholders and institutions related to the IS/IT and taxation national 
policies and implementation. The interviewees were obtained from related institutions and 
contexts to get a complete picture of the historical account and experience of the public sector 
IS/IT and taxation in Greece, and included stakeholders from both the public and private sector. 
The first author was the project owner from conception until the completion of the phase two, 
whereas the third author was a project manager in the private sector companLHV· consortium 
formed to implement the project. 
The data gathered through interviews were recorded and transcribed ad verbatim. They included 
specific project narratives and stories, which provided detail and insight into the processes of the 
taxation policy and IS/IT implementation. Eighty (80) semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
each lasting 60 minutes on average. The interview guide was adapted to the types of interviewees 
selected and in order to make sure that important areas of the policy and project were covered. 
The interview questions included three parts: the first part included questions about the necessity 
of implementing IS/IT to implement property taxation laws, the second part focused on the role 
of each interviewee per phase of the project, whereas the final part included questions on the role 
of the IS/IT-enabled taxation in reducing the public debt. Specific questions were targeted to 
highest echelons governmental stakeholders, e.g. related to the necessity property tax calculation 
and collection, the use of technology to this purpose, and the changes that took place at the policy 
level as the system emerged. All the interviews were conducted in Greek in order to enable the 
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participants to express themselves in a language that they would communicate without impairment 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). In the case where the participants did not agree to be tape-recorded, 
notes were kept to reflect their opinions. Strict confidentiality regarding the names of participants 
was applied. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim in Greek. Any notes from 
the interviews were also recorded in Greek. Important quotes from the interviews and notes were 
subsequently translated into English1.  
The events described in the project documents provided a time line on which the interview data 
was pegged to complete our narrative of the emergence of the IS/IT taxation system and policy. 
This emergence took place through the interaction particular technologies with top-managers of 
private IS/IT companies, high-echelon public policy makers, and the ministries of finance and the 
internal.  
The interview transcripts, notes, and project documents were analysed in a twofold way (Nijhia 
and Merali, 2013). We organised and collated data that resulted in factual description of the events 
in the project resulting in a chronological account of events and we then analysed these data to 
reflect, interpret and develop analytical accounts of the emergence of the taxation system and 
policy.  
To organise and analyse our primary data we used NVivo software. We tracked and collated 
themes, issues, and ideas from the transcript data, and identified key events and developments in 
the unfolding IS/IT and taxation policies and systems. The analysis was iterative and recursive 
between data and themes. As more transcripts and documents were added, the emergence of new 
themes was diminishing until no new themes could be added. To analyse the secondary data, we 
used a chronological account of the evolution of systems and IS/IT and taxation policy. This 
served as a skeleton for the interview narratives and analysis in a documented historical line, and 
was expanded with interview and observation data in the analytical step of our analysis.  
We developed an analytical history of the emergence of the system. The taxation system was 
perceived as a socio-technical assemblage that emerged from the interaction of agents, technology 
and socio-systemic constraints. The analysis was concerned with changes in taxation and IS/IT 
and their impact to the taxation system. We built the analysis by comparing and contrasting 
interview narratives and project documents. Five periods were identified inductively from the data 
as derivative nodes using NVivo from the chronological account. Each phase was analysed and 
presented as an analytical history of the emergence of the taxation policy and system.  
                                                          
1 One of the authors is full-time academic in the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 1 extrapolates the detailed timeline of events over the years as both policy and system 
emerged. Both IS/IT and policy are closely intertwined and were analysed at the same time to 

















Figure 1 : The timeline of events  
 
 
4. Case narrative: the Property Tax Information System (ETAK)  
Our case study covers a period of eighteen years, from 1997 to 2015, divided in four phases. It is 
noted that here is presented a summary of the emergence due to reasons of space and more details 
are included in Figure 1. However, we reveal the significant mechanisms to the reform of the 
Greek property taxation using IS/IT. The four phases are described next.  
 
4.1 Phase I (1997-2008): Initial attempts to establish and enforce a Property Tax and 
Property Registry 
Greek Governments had been trying to enforce a Property Tax (RET) in numerous occasions. 
But up to 2008, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was unable to get substantial revenues through 
RET, despite attempts by two Governments in the 90s. Legislation on RET had been introduced 
and abolished three times but tax evasion was high. To enforce such a tax, the State needed a 
citizen property register, a process for enlisting properties in the register, an IS/IT system to 
process the data from the property register on the basis of an algorithm for tax calculation and a 
mechanism for tax collection enforcement, as well as appropriately trained staff. The MoF lacked 
both the infrastructure and organizational capabilities.  
In 1997, a Large Property Tax (in Greek: ĭȂǹȆ Law 2459/1997) was imposed on high value 
properties, as a progressive tax. To enforce citizens to declare their property property, MoF also 
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introduced the property form (E9). E9 is a paper-based form submitted annually. The tax was 
calculated depending on the location of the property as well as features such as the area and type 
of the estate, enlisted by citizens in their E9. However, data were not entered consistently in an 
information system DQGZHUHRIWHQLQFRPSOHWHRUJRW¶ORVW·LQEXUHDXFUDF\$VDUesult, even though 
this tax only concerned a limited number of citizens, a database (DB) with their properties was not 
maintained. At that time there was no intention to use the E9 form (e.g. for locating the properties 
enlisted in E9 form) in order to implement a property tax system.  
In 2005, the Government decided to build a property (per citizen) database, using E9 form data 
(E9 DB), originally for monitoring land and building transactions. To promote e-government 
across Greece and build up the E9 DB with minimum problems in the quality of data, MoF created 
and freely distributed a software application that enabled filling the E9 form as a wizard. It was 
the first time that the E9 form could be electronically submitted, and led to up to 350.000 electronic 
submissions.  
In 2007, deviations from fiscal targets and EU targets occurred and friction in the relationship 
between Greece and EU started to emerge. An interviewee stated that the inability of the 
Government to enforce and collect RET was a technological, fiscal, but primarily a political issue: 
´7KLVLVQRWRQO\DWHFKQRORJLFDORUILVFDOPDWWHU,WLVGHHSO\SROLWLFDOVLQFHLWKDVWRGRZLWK
the way Greece is evaluated and regarded within the EU, it is a matter which is always 
discussed in EU Summits. And it is a shame that a matter relating to the taxation of real 
property of all citizens had not EHHQ WDFNOHG XQWLO WRGD\µ (High-echelon public 
employee). 
In 2007, the conservatives were in power. Property taxation using IS/IT had been low in the 
priority list. Any attempts by stakeholders to engage in the development of a new taxation system 
were dissolved in the political sphere, Stakeholders at the political and project level preserved what 
was accepted at the time, and did not encourage or favour innovation. This temporal ¶stasis· 
however, was to be changed in Phase II.  
 
 
4.2 Phase II (2008-2009): The emergence of ETAK for RET calculation and enforcement 
The remit of the EU to push for changes in the fiscal policy of Greece, triggered by the outburst 
of the global crisis, necessitated radical changes. The Greek Government sought for solutions to 
facilitate the execution of the fiscal budget and help the economy recover. To this purpose, the 
Government decided to reintroduce property tax, namely, ´3URSHUW\7D[µLQ*UHHN´(7$.µ, 
but, for the first time, aiming to include all properties, in 2008, with the expectation that the 
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introduction of a new RET would bring significant revenues. Tax bills were to be sent, also for 
the first time, directly to taxpayers to avoid tax evasion.  
Two possible ways to introduce ETAK emerged: either through the E9 form or electricity bills. 
The Greek public Electricity Company had a property register, but it was incomplete, often fed 
with inaccurate data and included only buildings (i.e. properties provided with electricity), 
excluding land. If ETAK were thus to be collected through electricity bills, an unfair, arbitrary tax 
would be assigned. Therefore, the only feasible solution was to use the E9 DB as the basis for 
building the ETAK system. As a consequence, the E9 DB project objectives were drastically 
modified to serve the ETAK project and its budget was significantly revised. This created 
challenges regarding the digitalisation, consistency, and validation of the existing E9 data. More 
importantly, there was no decision at the political level concerning the algorithm for estimating 
the value of the various property types, not even for the tax calculation algorithm.  
Nevertheless, the government decided to use the E9 form while the creation of the property 
database (E9 DB) was an on-going project. The decision was to create these specifications during 
the implementation of the system. ETAK was to be calculated as a progressive tax based on the 
overall appraisal of all family PHPEHU·VSURSHUWLHV. For the latter, the E9 attributes were to be used.  
The direction and user requirements of the project were ¶YLROHQWO\·changed: 
  
´7KH GLUHFWLRQ did not change from A to $·; it was from A to C; this is completely 
different!µ (Project manager) 
 
Decisions on property values, tax rates, and the calculation of the property tax were not taken a-
priori but during the implementation of the system. The project owner commented: 
 
´After eight months in the implementation of the project governmental decisions provided 
directives on how property value, tax rate, and tax for each property and for all properties 
registered in each tax statement were to be calculated. This is really important, because we 
are talking about a project that is implemented without any established processes for tax 
collection, nobody knew how properties would be appraised and how the tax would be 
FDOFXODWHGµ 
 




´The policies and regulatory framework came afterwards. The technical project specifications 
and the project status at a specific time frame determined the regulatory framework. The 
technology and project progress defined the user requirements a-posteriori based on the logic 
¶ZKDWFDQwe GRZLWKZKDWZHKDYH·µ 
 
When an algorithm was implemented in the system, it was this algorithm that was then expressed 
as a political/governmental decision. However, even then, tax calculation was not straightforward, 
as was determined as a progressive tax based on the overall appraisal of the family members· 
properties DIWHU H[FOXGLQJ WKH IDPLO\·V UHVLGHQFH RI WKH highest value, which was occasionally 
problematic.  
 
´The regulatory framework ²that is, government decisions on the way properties would be 
appraised, tax rates and tax calculation were like an acrobat walking on a tightrope, and 
balancing between what was feasible with the current technology/data and what was 
desirable by the government... this framework was formed LQDERWWRPXSZD\µ 
 
There was strong political pressure and will for rapid project implementation: the EU supported 
the project since the system would facilitate tax calculation and collection and therefore could help 
Greece overcome its financial problems. At the project level (IS/IT implementation), there was 
support from the project team, since it would help the Government collect taxes and therefore 
deal with the Greek fiscal problem. The plan was for the State to receive property tax income so 
that the fiscal goals for 2009 would be met as planned. The system was therefore in place within 
the first semester of 2009 and tax bills were accordingly sent to citizens. ETAK system brought 
apparent benefits for property tax calculation and enforcement, contributing to the successful 
execution of the fiscal budget.  
However, the global economic crisis burst in late 2008 and this impacted the already fragile Greek 
economy. 
 
´:KHQWKHsystem was in place in 2009, it was the first year when Greece had a huge 
budget deficit...it was the first year where Greece got its bad reputation... the global economic 
crisis had also arrived impacting the economy and then the story began... the inclusion of 




Therefore, in Phase II the policy-level regulatory framework was determined by the IS/IT system 
project and allowed MoF and Companies A and B to design and implement the system, the tax 
calculation algorithm, and the tax policy. Both the regulatory framework and system were 
necessitated by the reform-minded actors at the IS implementation level, including the project 
team (the private sector companies, the implementation team, and project managers from the 
public sector), and society. The influences of the requirements from EU conditioned these 
interactions. Large-scale change was possible and necessary to meet the demands of the economy, 
and this was translated as ¶pragmatism·. However, no matter if the system was in place and citizens 
had received their tax return forms, changes in the political scenery and economy triggered changes 
in the way the system would be used. 
 
 
4.3 Phase III (2009-2012): The start of the Memoranda era 
From Phase II it was apparent that the seamless operation of ETAK depended on two axes: firstly, 
up-to-date data; and secondly, up-to-date algorithms based on valuation bands for property 
appraisal and tax calculation. However, a new Government came into power in 2009, bringing 
changes and new priorities within the MoF. The new Government did not acknowledge at first 
the criticality of the ETAK system and its maintenance, improvement, and extension. At the 
political level, they decided to change the property tax law into a ¶new· WD[FDOOHG´3URSHUW\7D[µ
(in Greek: ´̘̄̓µ) that did not have a profound impact on the way the tax would be calculated, 
except from the tax rates. Furthermore, decisions previously taken regarding the ETAK system 
were challenged. Focus was: (i) on the way the system had been developed, that is, why E9 
digitisation was not performed in-house and was assigned to a contractor; and (ii) why the system 




priorities already set by the previous GovernmeQW«WKHUHFDQQRWEHDQ\FRQWLQXDWLRQLQWKH
implementation of large scale IS because the user-requirements constantly change... there is 
QRFRQWLQXLW\DQGQRFRQVLVWHQF\µ  
 
Attempts to update ETAK through outsourcing and in-house development failed and its  
maintenance came to a standstill, since (i) at the project (IS/IT implementation) level the 
alternative of open source was abandoned, and the tax algorithms were not updated; and (ii) at the 
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policy level there was limited political will for the maintenance and update of ETAK. When the 
Government tried to update the system by assigning the project to the same contractors without 
issuing a call for tender, they failed to convince the legal authorities who were responsible for 
authorizing this contract. In addition, it failed to ensure the necessary funds from the EU support 
framework and had to use funds from the state budget. 
At that time, rapid political developments took place. In May 2010, Greece entered the debt crisis 
period and the government called for help and signed a memorandum with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The deal included, inter alia, cuts in public spending and high taxes in 
exchange IRUD½ELOOLRQbailout. However, despite these attempts, the impact of the global 
recession and the fact that Greece did not conform to all points of the agreement with the IMF 
brought a second round of measures and financial aid from the EU, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the IMF, that is, the ¶7URLND·. A new memorandum (Memorandum II) was signed, 
which involved a ½110bn loan with stricter austerity measures, privatisation and structural reforms 
by 2015.  Fiscal goals on property taxes cannot be achieved for three consequent years (2009-
2011). Since there was no way to increase state revenues and the ETAK system could not be used 
as it was obsolete, the Government enforced a new property tax through electricity bills. The tax, 
called Special Property Tax for Electrified Surfaces (in Greek: ǼǼȉǾǻǼ Law) was nicknamed 
´HaraçµIURP7XUNLVK+DUDo: a poll-tax in the Ottoman Empire). The tax was calculated based 
on floor-area data, which are maintained by the electricity company, and it was collected through 
electricity bills. It was expected that the property tax would raise 2 Bn Euros, according to 
Government calculations. However: 
 
´WKHHaraç came about, which suggests a tax upon everybody, righteous or not. Everybody 
is protesting because it is really high and unfair and unrighteous... this tax is still into effect 
since it was introduced three years ago, although it was announced for one year. It is proved 
that if one cannot do something with the righteous way, he/she introduces something which 
is against people who bear all the burdens... the electricity company tax is only on the 
properties which can have electricity and these are only residences. Land is not included... if 
somebody has 15.000m2 land in an expensive area, he /she ZLOOQRWSD\DVLQJOHGLPHµ 
 
In November 2011, the Greek PM asked for a referendum on the EU deal. The reactions were 
rapid within Greece, and the PM resigned. The European stock-markets dropped around 3-4%. A 
Government of national unity was formed to take the country through the Memorandum II, which 
was finally ratified in February 2012 and activated a month later. In May 2012, national elections 
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took place. Since no Government FRXOGEHIRUPHGDVWURQJVSHFXODWLRQ¶*5([LW·ZDVto affect 
international markets. The formation of a coalition under the conservative party in June 2012 
ended this speculation.  
Therefore, in Phase III, the new dynamics within the assemblage concerned the abandonment of 
the ETAK at the project and policy level, whereas at the policy level the actors were organised in 
a new constellationWKDWLV´*RYHUQPHQWDQG7URLNDµto provide new policies (austerity measures 
and reforms). Citizens were no longer part of the property taxation reform process and were 
opposed to any austerity measures, no matter if the Government claimed these would get the 
country out of the crisis. The project and tax policy came to a standstill. However, no matter if 
ETAK system was or not part of the reform plan and tax policies, it would play an important role 
in Phase IV.  
 
4.4 Phase IV (2012-2015): Memorandum II and further challenges to property taxation  
In June 2012, the newly formed coalition Government had to proceed to radical reforms and 
privatisation. Still, the ETAK system was not used or maintained since 2011 and property tax was 
based on electricity bills.  
0HDVXUHVRI½EQZHUHGHFLGHGE\WKH*RYHUQPHQWLQ1RYHPEHU for a two-year extension 
of the bailout programme and further reduction of the debt. EU made it clear that RET should be 
reinforced through ETAK as revenues from three consecutive years (2009-2011) had not been 
collected. A sponsorship from the National Bank of Greece helped revitalising the system:  
 
´7he system is currently very difficult to be brought up to date...there was no concern 
regarding an appropriate maintenance. Therefore, new property data were not added, tax 
rates were not updated, property values could be estimated and thus no tax could be 
calculated, etc... the result is that the State could not collect the property tax. Previous 
Governments should have realised WKHFULWLFDOLW\RIWKHSURMHFWµ 
 
With the updated ETAK in place, RET bills for years 2009-2012 were issued starting from the 
summer of 2012. Revenues from RET were collected until the end of 2013. 
 
´,IWKHV\VWHPZDVPDLQWDLQHGDQGXSGDWHGZHZRXOGKDYHJDLQHGDURXQGPLOOLRQPRUH
income per year, and we would look more consistent to our EU partners. Income from 
RET raised from 487 million in 2010 to almost 3 billion euros at 2012 and 2013, as 
taxes where aggregately collected. It is not only a fiscal issue, but also one of credibility. In 
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political terms we could have achieved a better relationship with our partners. In financial 
terms, some of the measures included in the memorandum could have been avoided... we 
ZRXOGWKHQKDYHKDGDPHPRUDQGXP¶KDLUFXW·LQVWHDGµ 
 
In December 2013, the government decided to impose a new annual RET, namely ENFIA (in 
Greek: Ǽȃĭǿǹ) to be applied to all types of property, including agriculture estates. The previous 
tax (i.e. EETIDE) is abolished. The first tax bills were sent in August 2014. Protests from citizens 
increased as tax bills are delivered, as due to errors in tax calculation, some properties were found 
to be even 100 times more expensive. This resulted in a serious political issue for the government 
that became seriously unpopular, and this caused (according to opinion polls) the major defeat of 
the government at the national elections in 2015. 
Phase IV was turbulent. Both the Government and the Troika pushed for reforms. A number of 
reforms in taxation were to be materialised through the ETAK system. Citizens protested against 
austerity measures and unfair taxing mechanisms but they had to accept changes to occur through 
ETAK and property tax reform. There was, however, goodwill by ministers, top servants, and 
private sector companies that participated in the development of the ETAK system and tax policy. 
Necessary changes in the taxation policy were conducted, as dictated by the project and were 
followed by necessary reforms at the policy level. This was observed by the new initiatives at both 
the policy level (e.g. the request for extension and further help, which were not considered before), 
the revival of ETAK and the exchange of ideas at the project level (e.g. new policies for taxation 
of movable and immovable assets through ETAK) that were materialised at the policy level.  
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 IS implementation: motivation and intentionality  
In this paper we conceptualised the Greek taxation system as an assemblage that emerges of 
diverse sociomaterial elements (Table 1). We offer the nuances of intentionality and motivation 
and illustrate the different aims and goals of each of the actors, as were manifested in each of the 
phases. In phase I in particular, there was motivation and intentionality of all actors involved to 
encourage innovation and support the introduction of taxes, although this was later dissolved from 
the governmental actors within the assemblage. In Phase II however, both intentionality and 
motivation were high. There was political will from the government and citizens to collaborate in 
order to battle tax evasion, achieve the fiscal targets and help the economy recover through tax 
revenues. The two participating companies and the project consortium that was created aimed at 
successfully implementing the ETAK system. The motivations and intentions of the assemblage 
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were homogeneous. This, however, was to change in Phase III, where the different motivations 
and intentions of the actors constituting the assemblage contributed to its dissolution. Although 
at a political and project level there were motivated to fight tax evasion and help the Greek 
economy be strong again, these motivations did not include the use of ETAK, no matter if the 
benefits have been highlighted and its use was initiated in the previous phase. The Memoranda I 
and II had highlighted the need for the Greek government to proceed to deep structural changes; 
but the Government had no plans to maintain and update the system. The motivation of the 
SURMHFWFRQVRUWLXPZDVWKHRSSRVLWHEXWZLWKRXWVXSSRUWLW¶FROODSVHG·Therefore, the motivation 
and intentionality within the assemblage was low, and disintegration started to occur. In phase IV 
the coalition government had to proceed to the reforms as per Memorandum II, and improve the 
state of Greek Economy by, inter alia, collecting tax revenues and the use of system. The property 
taxes at this stage intended to deal with the aforementioned issues, and therefore intentionality was 
high for reforms (and the use of the system).  
 
Table 1: Motivation and intentionality for each of Phases I, II, III, and IV. 
 




Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Motivation 
(Passion) 
Human actors: (i) 
Greek government 








(i) Introduction of 
property tax; 
Motivation from 

















Human actors: (i) Greek 
government (MoF); (ii) 
Citizens (iii) EU; (iv) 







(i) Achievement of fiscal 
budget and help the 
economy recover through 
high tax revenues; 
(ii) helping State collect 




(iii) Changes in the fiscal 
policy of Greece, 
triggered by the outburst 
of the global crisis;  
(iii) Successful 






Human actors: (i) 
New Greek 
government (MoF); 
(ii) Citizens (iii) 
Project team (incl. 
MoF, A and B) (iv) 
IMF; (v) Troika (EU, 








political will to keep 
on updating ETAK, 
collecting taxes, and 
increasing revenues; 
(ii) No motivation, 
protesting against the 
new taxes and ȠȠȮȢȟȠ (Harac); 
(iii) Update/run 
ETAK system, but 
hampered by top 
level focus on 
redesigning the 
whole process and 




National Bank of 






(i) Political will to 
proceed to the 
reforms as per 
Memorandum II, 
improve the state 
of Greek 
Economy. Collect 
tax revenues and 
bring ETAK back 
to use; 
(ii) No motivation, 
protesting against 
the new taxes 
(iii) Help revive 
ETAK system for 
















Motivation is high for 
the tax revenues, 
although dissolved at 













Motivation is high for the 
ETAK system  
system, and use of 
Open Source; 
(iv) Improvement of 
Greek 
economy/debt via a 
½ELOOLRQEDLORXW, 
but in exchange: 
austerity measures 
and 
structural reforms to 
improve growth and 
competitiveness;  




loan with stricter 
austerity measures, 
privatisation and 
structural reforms, as 
well as a ¶debt 
KDLUFXW· 
(vi) Proceed to the 
reforms as per 
Memorandum II, 
improve the state of 
Greek Economy. 
 







exchange for a 
third bailout loan 
RI½EQIRUD
two-year extension 








Motivation is high for 
the ETAK system 
(this time ¶LPSRVHG










HNC, and E9 

























Non-human actors: (i) 
New property tax, that is 
ETAK; (ii) E9 form; (iii) 
Geographical maps (iv) 
Property tax Information 
system (ETAK system) 
(v) Tax collection policy 








(i) Property tax collection 
(i) Property size register 
(iii) Property location  
(iv) Property value and 
tax calculation, 
determination of the 
regulatory framework and 
policy for tax collection  
(v) Tax collection, 







(i) New tax name; (ii) 
New project policies: 
why not in house, 
why not open, google 
maps (iii) New 
property tax through 
electricity bills 
(Harac) (iv) 






(i) Different tax rates, 
no further changes; 




Source and Google 
maps; 
(iii) Tax collection, 




(iv) and (v): facilitate 
reforms, deal with 
Non-human 
actors: (i) New 










(i) Tax collection, 
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Intentionality is low for 
the ETAK system which 
is abandoned. Different 





Intentionality is high 
for reforms, deal with 
tax evasion through 




The contribution of this paper to the IS implementation literature is twofold: firstly, we argue 
towards the sociomaterial perspective (Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2008) in the study 
of IS and control systems implementation (Butler and McGovern, 2012; Sadiq et al., 2012; 
Papazafeiropoulou and Spanaki, 2017). Such a lens steers away from seeing IS implementation as 
apolitical (e.g. Davis, 1989; Dwivendi et al, 2017) and argues about the inseparability of social and 
the technical, the human and non-human, thereby illustrating the dynamics of assemblage formation 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) unfold over time by XVLQJWKHQXDQFHVRI¶motivation·DQG¶intentionality· 
(Burke, 1969a; 1969b; 2003 DeLanda, 2006; 2011) and their further operationalisation ¶passion·
and ¶desire· (Schandorf and Karatzogianni, 2014). Secondly, we offer an alternative 
conceptualization to IS implementation through the assemblage and ¶performation· (the process 
of performativity) lens; a successful implementation is linked to when the assemblage is performing 
as intended. Success is manifested through high motivation and intentionality. The human and 
non-human agents are motivated and their intention is to work towards the implementation of the 
system (and in this case the calculation and collection of property tax). Hence, our study extends 
the study of Yeow and Faraj (2014); our aim was not to find patterns of sociomaterial change, but 
to study the emergence of the assemblage of the particular system and policy as the outcome of 
the motivation and intentionality of the human and non-human agents.  
 
5.2 Implications for policy and practice 
Our paper is informative to public policy makers and top managers. For public policy makers and 
managers, our study argues that there is a need to attend to the emergent dynamics of both human 
and non-human entities that constitute the system. Since high levels of motivation and 
intentionality lead to higher chances of success (i.e. performativity success), it would be important 
for managers and policy makers to find ways of motivating staff to ensure success whilst ensuring 
that the appropriate policies and infrastructure are in place or can be secured. Furthermore, our 
case findings highlight the importance of: (i) securing political consensus for the implementation 
of tax policies and systems no matter what the political cost may be; (ii) communication between 
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policy makers and managers (including project and IT managers) so that decisions taken at a 
political level are pragmatic and can be translated into guidelines for systems·LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ, and 
vice-versa; (iii) cultivating a common innovative mindset and a culture prone to change that enables 
the wide adoption of policies and systems by the public. It is crucial to understand not only the 
technological aspects, but also the political, cultural, and power aspects of systems and policy 
implementation. However, these will require significant shift from a top-down implementation 
approach *that is usually the case) to a bottom-up approach and a significant investment in time, 





In this paper we focused on IS implementation in complex settings IURP D ¶VRFLRPDWHULDO·
perspective. We adopted the work of 'HOHX]H*XDWWDULDQG'HODQGDRQ¶DVVHPEODJHWKHRU\·DQG
%XUNH·V RQ PRWLYH H[SUHVVHG DV ¶LQWHQWLRQDOLW\· DQG ¶PRWLYDWLRQ· WR study the emergence of 
technology and policy as an assemblage constituted by human and non-human agents, using a 
longitudinal qualitative inductive case study of *UHHFH·V <HDUO\ 3URSHUW\ 7D[ SROLF\ DQG
information system over the period 1997-2015. Therefore, we contribute to the literature on IS 
implementation drawing on sociomateriality, by explaining the emergence of the system and policy 
as a sociomaterial assemblage and by using the concepts of motivation and intentionality as an 
apparatus to explain how assemblages come into being, how they are held together, and how they 
evolve into new forms. We propoVHGWKDWKLJKOHYHOVRIKXPDQDJHQWV·PRWLYDWLRQDQGQRQ-human 
DJHQWV· LQWHQWLRQDOLW\ DUH QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ SURFHVV DQG WKH
successful performation of the system and policy.  
The limitation of this study is based on the qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) tenets. 
In particular, the results cannot be generalised, but can be used to inform theory as we provide an 
alternative view of a phenomenon and our results need to be judged depending on the plausibility 
of the reasoning used when analysing the findings and drawing conclusions from our data.  
Our arguments could be further developed and extended in the future. In particular, a future study 
could involve the further study of patterns of sociomaterial change; using, for instance the 
concepts by Yeow and Faraj (2014) (constituting, counter-performing, calibrating, and stratifying) 
in conjunction with our proposed nuances to further refine the process of emergence. From a 
methodological point of view, future studies could further explore the use of measures of 
motivation and intentionality in order to provide more accurate findings of the different levels (if 
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they exist) of motivation and intentionality with regards to the emergence of technology and policy. 
We therefore intend to provide food for thought to academics and practitioners to further study 
the emergence and improve the success of policy and technology implementation. 
 
Postscript: The Greek taxation system is altogether operational. Even using a different name for 
property tax (i.e. ENFIA), taxation is solemnly based on the process and algorithms of ETAK. 
The ETAK system is consistently maintained, acknowledging the potential and significance of the 
property tax IS for the stability of the Greek economy and achieving fiscal targets. Based on the 
latest economic indicators, in 2016, property tax revenues were equal to 3.6B½, reaching almost 
0.8% of the total tax revenue %½, exceeding by almost 6 times the contribution of property tax 
in total tax revenue before the ETAK system (0.14% in 2008).  
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